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Abstract
This article presents updated indicators of employment protection legislation for
several central and eastern European countries according to OECD methodology.
Common patterns and outliers are identified and additional information is provided
to interpret correctly the strictness of the regulatory environment. The aim is to
provide some hard evidence for the debate regarding the interface between em-
ployment protection legislation and labour markets and welfare, based on the leg-
islations applying in central and east European countries at the end of 2003. The
article focuses on the 22 aspects of employment regulation encompassed within
the OECD model, examining how each relates to the employment protection legis-
lation in force in each country, and scores each one based on the relative restric-
tiveness of the regulation. The article concludes that the occurrence of informal
arrangements complicates the picture but that this does not invalidate the useful-
ness of examining formal rules in detail
Keywords: employment protection legislation, central and eastern Europe, regu-
lation, labour markets, contracts of employment, dismissal, notice and severance,
redundancy, trial periods, trade unions
Introduction
The effects of employment protection legislation on labour market and welfare have
been the subject of an intense theoretical and policy debate.2 Comprehensive and up-
dated indicators covering an extended set of countries are necessary to inform the de-
bate. The World Bank provides a measure of regulation concerning the hiring and firing
of workers for a broad set of countries (World Bank, 2003, 2004c; and Botero et al.
2004), while the OECD has calculated wide-ranging indicators in several waves for
member countries, covering different aspects of labour market regulation (OECD,
1999, 2004b).
In their analysis of labour markets in central and eastern European economies,
Cazes and Nesporova (2003) underline the need to have at hand updated measures of
the strictness of employment protection legislation for more countries in the region.
The purpose of this paper is to present employment protection legislation indicators for
a wide group of central and east European countries for recent years. The analysis of
1 The author would like to thank Sandrine Cazes and Alena Nesporova for their useful comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
2 See OECD (2004b) for a review.
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indices computed here, as well as a comparison of employment protection legislation
in different periods, has been conducted by Cazes and Nesporova (2007).
The methodology used is that which has been developed by the OECD (for details,
see OECD, 1999, Chapter 2; and OECD, 2004b, Chapter 2). In principle, besides labour
legislation, information on the prevailing provisions in collective labour contracts and
on judicial enforcement should also be used. However, due to the unavailability of
consistent data for the whole group of countries, only those regulations contained in
the Labour Codes and other relevant laws have been considered here.3
The OECD methodology puts a great deal of emphasis on strictly defining the rel-
evant regulation; however, some scope for interpretation is unavoidable. The OECD
has calculated indices for employment protection legislation for 2003 for Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic (OECD, 2004b). These calculations are
not identical to the ones presented here, although they are very similar. In some cases,
the difference is due to different basic information;4 in others, to different interpreta-
tions of the same information.,
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The indicators calculated here refer to the legislation in force on 31 December 2003
with the exception of Poland, where 31 December 2004 is the threshold. Changes in
the value of the index for 2004 are indicated in a note below each table.
Besides the calculated values of the indicators, a brief summary of the regulation
is provided, underlying the common patterns and outliers. The approach is to emphasise
all the information that may be relevant with which correctly to interpret the strictness
of the regulation. The indices developed by the OECD are useful precisely because
they compress information, but they should be handled with care. Thus, for instance,
3 See the Appendix for the list of legislation consulted.
4 For instance, the Slovakian Labour Code reads: ‘An employer may give an employee notice,
unless given on grounds of the unsatisfactory fulfilment of working tasks, for less serious
breaches of labour discipline or for reasons for which the immediate termination of employment
relationship is applicable, only in such cases where a) the employer does not have the possibility
to employ the employee further, not even for reduced working time, in the place which was agreed
as the place of work performance, and b) the employee is not willing to shift to other appropriate
work which has been offered to him/her by the employer at the place of work agreed as the place
of work performance.’ (Article 63§2, italics added). However, this is not reported in the OECD’s
A detailed description of employment protection regulation in force in 2003 (OECD, 2004a) and
indicator RC3A (the definition of unfair dismissal) for Slovakia in 2003 is, consistent with this
omission, but differently from here, scored 0 by the OECD.
5 For  instance,  the  Slovakian  Labour  Code  reads  ‘On  the  termination  of  the  employment
relationship, an employee shall be entitled to a severance allowance upon the termination of
employment at a minimum sum of a two-fold of his average monthly earnings if he agrees with
the termination of the employment relationship before the beginning of the expiry of the notice
period […]’ (Article 76§2). The OECD partly acknowledges this (OECD, 2004a: page 6, note
h), but fails to take into account that severance and notice are substitutes and not complements;
and, differently from here, assigns both two months of notice and two months of severance in
the case of redundancy.
6 A formal difference with the OECD indicators is that TC1A and TC2A have been inverted here
so as to keep the convention that higher scores represent stricter regulation.
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misleading without taking proper care that, in some countries, small firms are exempt
from some of the regulation.7 The OECD methodology does not distinguish between
firms of different size, so this information is provided in the commentary.
Employment protection legislation indicator
The indicator developed by the OECD is based on 22 aspects of employment regulation.
Each of these is assigned a score, following the convention that higher numbers mean
more restrictive regulations. These building blocks are then aggregated into various
intermediate indicators, taking values between 0 and 6, and successively aggregated
into a summary indicator, also within the same range.
Table 1 below presents the headline index and the three main intermediate indica-
tors. The first of these, i.e. regular contracts, concerns regulation in the case of the
dismissal on personal grounds or individual redundancy, but without fault, of an em-
ployee on an open-ended contract. The next, temporary contracts, regards regulation
on the use of time-limited contracts. The last, collective dismissal, considers rules in
the case of mass redundancies. Each of these intermediate indicators is analysed in
detail in the following sections.
Table 1 – The employment protection legislation index and the three main inter-
mediate indicators























Weight 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.6 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.6 2.1
Regular
contracts
RC 5/12 2.1 2.7 3.3 2.7 2.2 2.9 2.0 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.3
Temporary
contracts
TC 5/12 0.9 2.8 0.5 1.3 0.4 2.4 2.0 0.8 0.3 2.3 1.8
Collective
dismissal
CD 2/12 4.1 2.5 2.6 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.3 1.9 3.0 3.3 0.0
Note: for 2004:
EPL – CZ: 2.4; EE: 2.4
TC – CZ: 1.4; EE: 1.5
Regular employment
The index for dismissal in the case of regular contracts is made up of three sub-indices,
each having equal weight. The sub-index on procedural inconveniences refers to the
7 Boeri and Jimeno (2005) exploit exactly this feature to investigate the impact of employment
protection legislation on dismissal probabilities and the equilibrium size distribution of firms.
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regards notice and severance pay in the case of individual dismissals. The third sub-
index concerns the definition and consequences of unfair dismissal and the length of
the trial period. The table below presents these indices, followed by a description of
the basic aspects of the regulation making up each sub-index.
Table 2 – Dismissals from regular employment



























RC1 1/3 2.0 3.0 3.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Notice and
severance pay
RC2 1/3 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.0 3.2 1.4 3.3 1.8 1.8 2.5
Difficulty of
dismissal
RC3 1/3 2.5 3.0 3.8 3.8 3.0 3.5 2.0 4.3 3.3 3.3 4.3
Procedural inconveniences
In all countries except Ukraine, notice has to be delivered in written form. Only Bul-
garia, Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine do not explicitly require the reason for the
dismissal to be provided. Employees’ representatives, namely the trade union or the
works council, need to be involved in the standard8 procedure of dismissal. Hungary
and Bulgaria represent an exception in this regard, while in Slovenia a request from the
employee is necessary. In some countries also, the involvement of the employment
office is required. In Estonia, if the employment relationship is terminated because of
liquidation or the lay-off of employees, the employment office has to be informed while
in Ukraine, the same has to be done where the firm cannot offer another job or the
worker refuses it.
In general, third parties have simply to be informed. However, employee represen-
tatives play a larger role in some countries. In Croatia and Czech Republic, notice must
be discussed with them. This is also the case in Lithuania for dismissals on economic
or technological grounds or due to the restructuring of the workplace. In Slovakia, there
is a legal obligation to negotiate notice with employee representatives.
8 Concerning the dismissal of workers not belonging to protected categories (e.g. pregnant women
or trade union officials).
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Weight 2.0 3.0 3.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Procedures RC1A 1/2 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0
Delay in
giving notice
RC1B 1/2 1.0 2.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
An even stronger role for trade unions is envisaged in the Ukrainian labour code,
where the termination of the labour contract of a trade union member generally requires
their preliminary consent. In Bulgaria, the labour code explicitly allows for collective
agreements to require the prior consent of the trade union in cases of staff cuts or a
reduction in the volume of work. In Slovenia, the consent of the trade union is not
required, but it can oppose termination for reason of incapacity or fault and, in this case,
the employee may require that the termination of the contract does not become effective
until the expiry of the term for judicial protection.
The involvement of employee representatives before the giving of notice is subject
to precise time limits in Croatia (eight days for the works council to submit its obser-
vations); in Slovakia (ten days for negotiations to take place); and in Ukraine (eighteen
days for the trade union to examine the case and inform the employer of its decision).
In Poland, the trade union has the right only to be informed about the intended notifi-
cation, but the delivery of the notice is suspended for five days after information has
been given in writing, during which period the trade union may present written objec-
tions. In Slovenia, the formal opposition of the trade union must be registered within
eight days of receiving the information, but this does not delay the delivery of notice
by the employer.
In cases of the delivery of notices of dismissal on personal grounds, Croatia, Hun-
gary and Slovenia explicitly require that the employee is given the opportunity to pro-
vide a defence. A written warning must have been delivered during the previous twelve
months in the Czech Republic and the previous six months in Slovakia.
Notice and severance
All the countries regulate notice periods in the case of dismissal and all but Poland
regulate severance pay.
The labour code usually provides exact figures, or minimum thresholds, although
this is not the case in Bulgaria and Russia, where severance pay is intended to com-
pensate for loss of earnings arising from unemployment subject to a maximum thresh-
old. A maximum notice period that can be agreed upon by the parties is set down in
Bulgaria and Hungary, while an upper limit to severance pay exists in Croatia and in
Slovenia.
There is an even share between countries where seniority changes the position and
where rules are the same irrespective of length of service. In the first group, some
Employment protection legislation in central and east European countries 
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ference is between those whose years of service are above or below five years. Other
systems are much more detailed. In Hungary, there are seven different periods of notice
and six amounts of severance payment, depending on length of service. The regulation
of the severance allowance in Slovenia and Croatia is peculiar in that compensation is
a given fraction of monthly salary for each year of service, with the additional feature
in Slovenia that the fraction itself depends on seniority.9 In Lithuania, severance pay
alone depends on seniority, while in Poland it is just the notice period. In Estonia, the
system differs depending on the reasons for which the employment contract is termi-
nated. Both notice and severance depend on seniority if termination is due to the lay-
off of employees or age; in contrast, length of service does not matter if it is unsuitability
or the long-term incapacity of the employee that are the causes of the dismissal.
Table 4 – Notice and severance pay















































RC2B3 4/21 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.0
The reasons for termination matter in other countries as well. In the Czech Republic,
notice is one month longer if the dismissal is due to relocation, technological or or-
ganisational changes. In Slovenia, another source of differentiation besides seniority
9 Thus, in Slovenia, for seniority of between one and five years, severance pay is one-fifth of the
monthly wage for each year of employment, increasing to one-quarter for seniority of between
five and fifteen years and one-third for those above fifteen years (Employment Relationships
Act, Art.109).
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Republic, Estonia, Russia and Slovakia, severance pay depends on the reasons for the
dismissal, with redundancy due to economic reasons usually implying a more advan-
tageous treatment. In some countries, there are specific rules for workers reaching or
approaching qualification for retirement. Notice is longer in Croatia for workers who
are over 50 and 55, as it is also in Lithuania for workers due to qualify for an old age
pension within five years. In the latter case, Hungary prescribes an additional severance
payment, while no payment is due to workers already qualifying as pensioners. In
contrast, Bulgaria reserves particularly favourable conditions for these workers, while
separate rules on severance pay exist also in Slovakia. A peculiarity of the Slovak labour
code is that entitlement to severance allowance develops only if the employee agrees
with the termination of the employment relationship prior to the commencement of the
period of notice, thus making notice and severance pay substitutes, rather than com-
plements for each other as in other countries.
Difficulty of dismissal
Grounds for dismissal are regulated with different degrees of detail. The Bulgarian and
Russian labour codes contain a long list of specific cases in which a labour agreement
can be terminated by the employer, while the Hungarian and Lithuanian ones simply
state the broad principles which apply as regards when a dismissal may be justified.
The Polish code is particular in that it refrains from positively regulating when a dis-
missal is allowed, stating instead that ‘Each party may terminate a contract of employ-
ment by notice’ (Art.32§1) and including some exceptions for specific categories.
Table 5 – Difficulty of dismissal








































1/4 6.0 4.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 6.0
Redundancy constitutes a sufficient ground of dismissal everywhere. The definition
of dismissal for ‘business reasons’ varies, but a reduction in the number of employees,
or no further requirement to perform certain work tasks, appears in all legislations.
The scene is more mixed in the case of dismissals due to capability. In Russia and
Ukraine, only the state of health or insufficient qualifications constitute sufficient
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explicitly mentioned as an admissible cause instead while, in other countries, grounds
for dismissal include ‘personal reasons’ beyond health and professional qualifica-
tions.10
In all countries with the exception of Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, a transfer to
a different job has to be attempted prior to dismissal. In Croatia, Czech Republic and
Slovenia, the retraining of workers is also explicitly mentioned. When selecting work-
ers to dismiss, employers in Croatia and Lithuania are required to take into account
factors like seniority, age and the number of dependants in the employee’s family. In
Estonia, a detailed hierarchy exists in which preferential treatment is reserved first of
all for employee representatives; then to those for whom the job is their principal one;
followed by workers with better levels of performance; and, lastly, by those with de-
pendants, the longest seniority, an occupational illness; etc. In Ukraine, several social
considerations must be taken into account when choosing among employees with equal
labour productivity and qualifications. In Bulgaria, selection in cases of dismissal is
not intended to protect some categories but to boost productivity, since it is stated in
the labour code that an employer may dismiss ‘employees whose positions have not
been made redundant in order to retain employees of higher qualifications and better
performance’ (Art.329).
An important characteristic concerning the applicability of the rules on dismissal
in Croatia and in Slovenia is the relevance of the size of the employer: in Croatia, the
rules on the grounds for dismissal, on transfer to a different position and on selection
do not apply to employers with twenty or fewer employees; in Slovenia, the rules on
transfers do not apply to employers with ten or fewer employees.
A three-month limit is commonly established as the duration of a standard trial
period. Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia, however, set the limit at six months, while
Estonia specifies four months. The maximum duration may be extended to six months
in Lithuania in cases specified by the law, while in Ukraine the same is true in special
cases and after agreement with the trade union. Ukraine also fixes a lower limit of one
month for labourers, while in the Hungarian code the default trial period is one month.
In cases of unfair dismissal, labour codes usually mandate the employer to pay
compensation for loss of earnings plus, in some countries, additional penalties, par-
ticularly in cases where the employee is not reinstated to their previous position. There
are, however, some exceptions. The Slovenian labour code does not directly regulate
the subject, but refers to the ‘rules of civil law’ (Art.118§1). In cases of non-reinstate-
ment, the criteria to determine compensation in Croatia are the ‘duration of the labour
relationship, age and the obligation to support dependants’ instead of the loss of earn-
ings (Art.123§1). In the same situation, a lump sum compensation equivalent to six
months at the average wage is awarded in Estonia.
The amount of compensation or the penalty that can be awarded is limited in several
countries. An upper limit exists in Bulgaria (six months average earnings); in Poland
10 A curiosity about sufficient grounds for dismissal is the explicit mentioning in the Russian
code of ‘termination of access to State secrets’ and, in the Estonian case, the stress put on
language skills.
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in Ukraine (one year, but potentially longer if legal proceedings take more than one
year through no fault of the employee). In addition, a lower limit exists in Croatia,
where compensation in cases of non-reinstatement should be between three and eigh-
teen months average earnings; in Hungary (a penalty of between two and twelve months
in cases of non-reinstatement); and in Poland (in cases of non-reinstatement, compen-
sation is between two weeks and three months, but no lower than the level of remu-
neration for the period of notice). In Czech Republic and Slovakia, the employer can
ask to reduce or discontinue a compensatory wage if the period over which it should
be paid is higher than six and nine months respectively. In Slovakia, the labour code
specifies the right to receive compensation equivalent to the period of notice in cases
of invalid summary termination; in Hungary, besides compensation for lost earnings,
both notice and severance should be paid in these types of cases; while, in Lithuania,
severance pay should be added to compensation for lost wages in cases of non-rein-
statement.
In the case of illegal dismissal, reinstatement is contemplated in all the countries.
However, in Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, the labour
code explicitly allows the court to refuse it in particular circumstances.
Temporary contracts
The index on temporary contracts is made up from a sub-index concerning an employ-
ment relationship based on a fixed-term contract, and another sub-index concerning
the hiring-out of workers by a temporary work agency.
As in the previous section, a table is first presented on the indices; and then a de-
scription is provided of the basic aspects of regulation.
Table 6 – Temporary contracts























Weight 0.9 2.8 0.5 1.3 0.4 2.4 2.0 0.8 0.3 2.3 1.8
Fixed term
contracts
TC1 1/2 1.4 3.3 0.5 2.0 0.3 4.3 1.0 1.0 0.1 2.3 3.0
Temporary
work agencies
TC2 1/2 0.5 2.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.0 0.5 0.5 2.3 0.5
Note: for 2004:
TC – CZ: 1.4; EE: 1.5
TC1 – CZ: 1.3; EE: 2.5
TC2 – CZ: 1.5
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The extent to which temporary contracts are allowed in addition to ‘objective’ situa-
tions11 varies widely. In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, there are no restrictions on
their applicability. In the Czech Republic, limitations exist as regards school graduates
and adolescents, but may be over-ridden on the written request of the worker. In Bul-
garia a written request, as well as ‘specific economic, technological, financial, market
and other similar objective reasons’ (Labour Code, supplementary provisions, §1) con-
stitutes sufficient ground to establish a fixed-term contract outside ‘objective’ situa-
tions.12 In Russia, a fixed-term labour contract can be concluded by employers with up
to forty employees,13 with employees working part-time and in several other circum-
stances. On the other hand, Croatia and Ukraine basically limit the use of fixed-term
contracts only to ‘objective’ situations, while Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia allow
fixed-term contracts in some specific additional cases.
Table 7 – Fixed-term contracts




































TC1C 1/4 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0
Note: for 2004:
TC1B – EE: 2.0
TC1C – CZ: 3.0
Limitations also exist with regard to the renewal and duration of temporary con-
tracts. Bulgaria has a particularly tight regulation in that temporary contracts cannot be
11 ‘Objective’ situations refer to specific projects, seasonal work, the replacement of temporarily
absent permanent workers (i.e. on sickness or on maternity leave) and for reasons of excep-
tional workload (OECD, 1999, p. 106).
12 In the Bulgarian context, ‘objective’ situations are defined as the ‘execution of temporary,
seasonal or short-term work and activities’ (Art.68§2), as well as the hiring of new employees
in enterprises that have been declared bankrupt or are in liquidation.
13 Up to 25 people in the trading and consumer services organisations (Art.59).
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newed more than once. Moreover, there are also rules concerning their minimum du-
ration. Limitations on the number of successive contracts exist also in Lithuania and
were introduced in 2004 in Estonia and Poland. However, the minimum gap for two
contracts not to be considered consecutive is quite low, at one month in Poland and
Lithuania and two months in Estonia, making the restriction less effective. Rules lim-
iting the duration of a single contract to a maximum of five years are present in Lithuania
and Russia, and were introduced in 2004 also in Estonia.
Other countries have limits on the total duration of an employment relationship
which is based on fixed-term contracts. The limit in Hungary is five years; in Croatia,
it is three years; while in the Czech Republic, a two-year limit, with some exceptions,
was introduced in 2004. In Slovakia, the limit of three years to a fixed-term employment
relationship does not apply to employers with twenty or fewer employees and in some
other cases. Regulation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is made more severe by
the comparatively high minimum gap under which an employment relationship may
be considered as continuous, fixed at six months. Also in Slovenia, there is a three-year
general limit, which was decreased to two years in 2007 for employers with more than
ten employees, and in 2010 for employers with ten or fewer employees. An implicit,
even if in some cases very loose, limit on the duration of a fixed-term employment
relationship exists also in countries like Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia, where limits
on the duration of single contracts are combined with restrictions on their renewal.
Temporary work agencies
Specific regulations on the leasing out of employees by temporary work agencies
(TWAs) is present in just some of the countries, usually having been recently intro-
duced.
Table 8 – Temporary work agencies



























TC2A 1/2 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0
Restrictions on
no. of renewals




TC2C 1/4 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0
Note: for 2004:
TC2C – CZ: 4.0
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on strike. Croatia, Poland and Slovenia also make it illegal to hire out workers to per-
form dangerous jobs and have further restrictions in case the client employer has shed
employees in the near past. The use of temporary work in Poland is restricted to ‘ob-
jective’ situations,14 while the Croatian and Slovenian labour codes explicitly mention
the possibility of introducing restrictions through collective agreements.
A rule also exists in these countries fixing the maximum duration of employment
gained through a TWA to twelve months. In Croatia and Slovenia, the restrictions are
somewhat loose since they are based on the same worker performing the same work,
and the minimum gap is just one month. The restrictions are tighter in Poland, where
the one year limit applies in any consecutive 36 months.
The Czech Republic also introduced a twelve-month limit in 2004, but this can be
disapplied on the request of the worker involved. The regulation on TWAs in Hungary
and in Slovakia does not pose relevant restrictions.
Collective redundancy
The index on collective redundancy is based on direct measures of regulation, without
being built on intermediate sub-indices, as in the previous cases. The level of regulation
is described below.
Table 9 – Collective dismissals















































3.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
There are basically two ways in which a collective dismissal is defined. In the first,
‘differentiated’ definition, a collective redundancy occurs when, within one month, the
14 Defined as ‘seasonal, periodic ad hoc tasks; tasks whose timely performance by the workers
of the client employer would not be possible; and tasks normally falling within the ambit of
an absent worker employed by the client employer’ (Act on the Employment of Temporary
Workers, Art. 2).
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and one hundred; 10% of the workforce, for firms between one hundred and three
hundred; and thirty employees, if the firm has more than three hundred workers. Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland apply exactly this definition. Estonia and Lithuania
extend it to firms with less than twenty employees, fixing in this case the threshold at
five employees in Estonia and ten in Lithuania.
In the second, ‘undifferentiated’ definition of collective redundancy, the minimum
number of lay-offs is twenty within three months, irrespective of the size of the firm.
Croatia applies this definition. Somewhat puzzlingly, in Bulgaria and Slovenia there is
a collective redundancy if either of the two definitions apply.15 The Russian labour
code leaves the definition of collective redundancy to industrial and geographical
agreements, while the Ukrainian one does not mention any.
All countries with specific regulation present additional requirements in the case
of collective redundancies. Additional actors, usually a labour office, some local ad-
ministration, or both, have to be involved and the role of actors like employee repre-
sentatives is deepened compared to individual dismissal cases. This greater involve-
ment of third parties leads everywhere to additional delays in the notification process.
Moreover, several labour codes require the drafting of a plan to cope with the redun-
dancy, or at least to negotiate or consult on measures aimed at avoiding or alleviating
its consequences. Poland, however, is the only country where additional severance pay
is prescribed in cases of collective redundancy.
Conclusions
In this article, employment protection legislation indicators according to the OECD
methodology for 2003-4 have been presented for several central and east European
countries. A brief outline of the level of regulation behind the indices has also been
provided. The scope of the applicability of the legislative provisions, as well as some
aspects of the legislation not captured by the OECD methodology, have been high-
lighted with the aim of helping towards the correct interpretation of the indices. More-
over, common patterns and outliers have been identified.
In some of the countries under consideration, informal arrangements (like employ-
ment without a contract, payments above the official wage) are widespread (see OECD,
2004a; Chapter 5) and should be taken into consideration when assessing the strictness
of regulation. However, the lack of detailed indicators on the form and extension of
these informal arrangements makes their inclusion into standardised indices rather dif-
ficult. This, however, does not invalidate the usefulness of looking at formal rules. On
the one side, even in economies with widespread informality, formal rules apply to a
relevant size of the labour market. On the other side, the desire to avoid formal rules
is often quoted as one of the reasons for informal arrangements, so a comparable indi-
cator like the one presented here can help in shedding light on the roots of informality
itself.
15 A firm shedding thirty employees within one month has clearly shed more than twenty em-
ployees within three months, thus making part of the first definition simply redundant.
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Appendix – Consulted legislation
The texts are usually available in the ILO database, NATLEX.
Bulgaria
Labour Code, as amended up to 18 June 2004.
Employment Promotion Act, as amended up to 29 December 2002.
Croatia
Labour Act, as amended up to 21 September 2004.
Czech Republic
Labour Code, as amended up to 2002.
Estonia
Employment Contracts Act, as amended up to 22 April 2004.
Hungary
Labour Code, as amended up to Act No. 20/2003.
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Labour Code of 4 June 2002.
Poland
Labour Code, consolidated text, 2005.
Act on the Employment of Temporary Workers, 9 July 2003.
Act on the Special Principles of Terminating Employment with Employees Due to
Reasons Not Attributable to Employees, 13 March 2003.
Slovakia
Labour Code, as amended up to July 2004.
Slovenia
Employment Relationships Act, 24 April 2002.
Russia
Labour Code, 31 December 2001.
Ukraine
Labour Code, as amended up to 18 November 2004.
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